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Summary
Between September 2012 and January 20, 2017, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) received re-
ports from 27 countries of 1879 laboratory-con-
firmed cases in humans of the Middle East respi-
ratory syndrome (MERS) caused by infection with 
the MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and at least 
659 related deaths. Cases of MERS-CoV infection 
continue to occur, including sporadic zoonotic in-
fections in humans across the Arabian Peninsula, 
occasional importations and associated clusters 
in other regions, and outbreaks of nonsustained 
human-to-human transmission in health care set-
tings. Dromedary camels are considered to be the 
most likely source of animal-to-human transmis-
sion. MERS-CoV enters host cells after binding the 
dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP-4) receptor and the 
carcinoembryonic antigen–related cell-adhesion 
molecule 5 (CEACAM5) cofactor ligand, and it 
replicates efficiently in the human respiratory epi-
thelium. Illness begins after an incubation period 
of 2 to 14 days and frequently results in hypoxemic 
respiratory failure and the need for multiorgan 
support. However, asymptomatic and mild cases 
also occur. Real-time reverse-transcription–poly-
merase-chain-reaction (RT-PCR) testing of respi-
ratory secretions is the mainstay for diagnosis, and 
samples from the lower respiratory tract have the 
greatest yield among seriously ill patients. There 
is no antiviral therapy of proven efficacy, and thus 
treatment remains largely supportive; potential vac-
cines are at an early developmental stage. There 
are multiple gaps in knowledge regarding the 
evolution and transmission of the virus, disease 
pathogenesis, treatment, and prospects for a vac-
cine. The ongoing occurrence of MERS in humans 
and the associated high mortality call for a con-
tinued collaborative approach toward gaining a 
better understanding of the infection both in hu-
mans and in animals.
MERS-CoV was first identified in September 
20121 in a patient from Saudi Arabia who had hy-
poxemic respiratory failure and multiorgan illness. 
Subsequent cases have included infections in hu-
mans across the Arabian Peninsula, occasional 
importations and associated clusters in other re-
gions, and outbreaks of nonsustained human-to-
human transmission in health care settings (Fig. 1).
Epidemiology
Overview
As of January 20, 2017, the WHO had received 
reports from 27 countries of 1879 cases of labo-
ratory-confirmed MERS and at least 659 related 
deaths (percentage of fatal cases, 35%).2 Approxi-
mately 80% of reported cases have been linked to 
exposure in Saudi Arabia (Fig. 2). Transmission of 
MERS-CoV between dromedary camels and hu-
mans has been documented in several countries. 
Human-to-human transmission in health care set-
tings accounts for the majority of reported cases to 
date, although human-to-human transmission in 
household settings has also been identified (Fig. 3).
Animal-to-Human Transmission
Seroepidemiologic studies have shown that anti-
bodies to MERS-CoV are present in dromedary 
camels (Camelus dromedarius) throughout the Middle 
East and Africa, and studies indicate that MERS-
CoV has circulated among dromedaries for at least 
three decades. Although MERS-CoV RNA has been 
detected in respiratory and other bodily secretions, 
particularly among juvenile dromedaries, infec-
tions in dromedaries may cause only mild upper 
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respiratory manifestations. Investigations of ani-
mals in close proximity to reported cases in hu-
mans support the theory that dromedaries are the 
most likely source of animal-to-human transmis-
sion.5 One case–control study showed that persons 
presenting with community-acquired MERS were 
7 times as likely as controls to have had direct 
exposure to dromedaries during the preceding 
2 weeks.6 In addition, seroepidemiologic studies 
indicate that infection may be associated with oc-
cupational exposures to dromedaries. In one study 
conducted in Saudi Arabia, the rate of MERS-CoV 
seropositivity was 15 times as high in shepherds 
and 23 times as high in slaughterhouse workers 
as in the general population.7 There is high se-
quence homology between the viruses from spo-
radic cases in humans and the implicated drome-
daries. Although the routes of transmission remain 
unclear, they appear to include contact with infec-
tious nasal or other bodily secretions and possibly 
the consumption of raw dromedary products 
(e.g., unpasteurized milk). Although dromedary-
to-human transmission of MERS-CoV is now well 
recognized, direct exposure to dromedaries has 
been documented in only 40% of primary cases.6 
(For further details, see Tables S1 and S2 in the 
Supplementary Appendix, available with the full 
text of this article at NEJM.org.)
Human-to-Human Transmission
Non–Health Care Settings
Human-to-human transmission appears to be in-
frequent outside health care settings but has been 
documented after close household contact with 
infected persons.8 Among 280 household contacts 
evaluated in a study conducted in Saudi Arabia, 
4.3% had positive results for MERS-CoV on real-
time RT-PCR assay or serologic assay.9 In one 
household cluster in which 24% of 79 extended 
family members were affected, risk factors for 
infection included sleeping in an index patient’s 
room and touching respiratory secretions from an 
index patient.10 Very little or no household trans-
mission has been detected in other countries in 
which MERS-CoV infections have been reported,11 
and no sustained human-to-human transmission 
has been documented in any country to date.
One seroepidemiologic study conducted in Saudi 
Arabia with the use of samples collected in 2012–
2013 showed that antibodies to MERS-CoV were 
present in 0.15% of 10,009 participants; this find-
ing suggests that more than 40,000 unrecognized 
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infections may have occurred.7 During the 2014 
outbreak in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 25% of MERS 
cases were reported to be asymptomatic.12 The role 
of persons with asymptomatic infections in human-
to-human transmission remains unclear but may 
be underappreciated.7,13 Increasingly sensitive sur-
veillance strategies and follow-up for all contacts 
are contributing to the increased recognition of 
asymptomatic cases.12,14
 Health Care Settings
The earliest cases of MERS were identified retro-
spectively in a hospital-associated cluster in Jordan 
in April 2012,15 and transmission within health 
care settings has remained a prominent epidemio-
logic feature of MERS. During the 2014 MERS 
outbreak in Jeddah, 31% of the affected patients 
were health care personnel, and 88% of the affected 
patients who were not health care personnel had 
been admitted to or visited a health care facility 
within 14 days before symptom onset.12 During 
2015 and 2016, nosocomial outbreaks occurred 
in health care facilities in Jordan,2 South Korea,14
and Saudi Arabia.16 In the Korean outbreak, which 
has been the largest outbreak outside the Middle 
East, transmission from a single infected person 
led to 186 cases and 36 deaths (case fatality rate, 
19.4%) across multiple health care facilities.14 Over-
crowded emergency departments, delays in diag-
nosis, and substandard practices for infection con-
trol have been identified as contributing factors in 
outbreaks that occur in health care settings.12,17
Available epidemiologic observations suggest 
that human-to-human transmission occurs pri-
marily through close contact with a patient who 
has confirmed MERS, most likely through respi-
ratory droplets. The risk of transmission appears 
to be greater during the performance of aerosol-
generating procedures without adequate personal 
protection or proper room ventilation.18 In addi-
tion, contamination of environmental surfaces in 
patient rooms with MERS-CoV may result in trans-
mission.19,20 One study isolated the infectious virus 
from air samples from MERS isolation wards, al-
though this finding requires confirmation.20
 Travel to and from the Arabian Peninsula
Persons with MERS who have been identified in 
regions other than the Arabian Peninsula have 
either recently traveled to the Arabian Peninsula 
or have had contact with someone returning from 
the Arabian Peninsula.21 Despite the large number 
of persons visiting Saudi Arabia yearly for the Hajj 
and Umrah pilgrimages, no pilgrimage-related 
cases of MERS have been reported.22 Although two 
Dutch pilgrims returning from the 2014 Hajj re-
Figure 2. Geographic Distribution of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome.
Data are from the World Health Organization (www.who.int/emergencies/mers‑cov/mers‑summary‑2016.pdf) and were collected 
through December 2, 2016. At that time, the total number of cases was 1841.
Countries with no cases
Countries with 1–49 cases
Countries with 50–999 cases
Countries with ≥1000 cases
United States (2)
United Kingdom (4)
Philippines (2)
South Korea (185)
China (1)
Arabia (1482)
Malaysia (1)
Thailand (3)
Germany (3)
Tunisia (3)
Austria (2)
Algeria (2)
Jordan (28)
Greece (1)
France (2)
Italy (1)
Egypt (1)
Oman (7)
Bahrain (1)
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ceived a diagnosis of MERS,11 the source of their 
infection remains unclear, and other members 
who traveled in the same tour group reported visit-
ing camel markets and consuming raw camel milk 
during activity unrelated to Hajj. Saudi Arabian 
authorities have banned the presence of camels 
near holy sites to minimize exposure to potentially 
infected camels.23
Host Risk Factors
The majority of severe MERS cases have occurred 
in adults older than 50 years of age who have 
coexisting conditions such as diabetes, hyperten-
sion, cardiac disease, obesity, chronic respiratory 
disease, end-stage renal disease, or cancer or in 
persons receiving immunosuppressive therapy 
(Table S5 in the Supplementary Appendix). Older 
age and chronic respiratory illness have been as-
sociated with death among infected patients.17 
Mild and asymptomatic infections have occurred 
predominantly among young and healthy persons, 
including health care workers.12,17 Clinically recog-
nized infections among children are uncommon.24 
Host genetic risk factors have not been document-
ed to date.
Virology
MERS-CoV is the sixth coronavirus and the first 
betacoronavirus of the C phylogenetic lineage 
known to infect humans.25 (Lineage A includes 
HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1, and lineage B in-
cludes the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
[SARS] coronavirus [SARS-CoV].) Similar to other 
coronaviruses, MERS-CoV is enveloped, contains 
a very large (30 kb) single-stranded positive-sense 
RNA genome,26 and replicates in the host-cell cyto-
plasm. Sixteen nonstructural proteins serve roles 
in replication, including a novel RNA proofread-
ing exonuclease that regulates replication fidel-
ity27 (Table S3 in the Supplementary Appendix). 
MERS-CoV tropism is determined primarily by 
binding of the virus spike glycoprotein to the cell-
surface molecule, DPP-4 (Fig. 3). Attachment and 
entry are further facilitated by a recently discov-
ered cellular cofactor, CEACAM5.28 The spike gly-
coprotein can be activated to its fusogenic form 
by the host-cell transmembrane serine protease 
TMPRSS2, endosomal cathepsins, and furin; this 
suggests that there are multiple possible pathways 
of spike maturation, viral entry into the cell, and 
virion assembly.29,30 Circulating strains of human 
MERS-CoV to date appear to represent a single 
serotype.31 Serum from convalescent patients with 
MERS29 and neutralizing monoclonal antibodies 
to the receptor-binding site of the spike glycopro-
tein inhibit infection of cells by the virus.32,33
Human Pathogenesis
Host-Cell Targets
DPP-4 is widely expressed on human cells, includ-
ing fibroblasts, intestinal epithelial cells, and he-
patocytes, and it has weak expression in the 
lung.34 CEACAM5 has a pattern of expression 
that is more specific to cell type. In the gene-
expression atlas FANTOM5,34 only a small num-
ber of tissues have detectable expression of both 
DPP-4 and CEACAM5, including tissues from the 
trachea, throat, small intestine, colon, and appen-
dix. In a finding consistent with this observation, 
MERS-CoV has been shown to replicate well in 
human cell lines derived from respiratory and in-
testinal epithelium.35
In an ex vivo model of human lung-tissue in-
fection, DPP-4 expression, MERS-CoV antigen, and 
viral particles were found in bronchial epithelial 
cells, type I and type II alveolar pneumocytes, 
and vascular endothelial cells; the result was cell 
death and diffuse alveolar damage (Fig. 3).36 Al-
veolar macrophages appeared to be relatively 
spared.36 A similar pattern of DPP-4 distribution 
and viral replication has been seen in nonhuman 
primate models.37,38
Viral Kinetics
MERS-CoV RNA is detected more frequently and 
at higher viral loads in samples from the lower 
respiratory tract than in samples from the upper 
respiratory tract39 and can persist in some patients, 
particularly the most severely ill patients, for more 
than 1 month.40 MERS-CoV RNA has also been 
detected in blood or serum samples from up to 
one third of patients presenting with MERS41; pos-
itive tests for MERS-CoV RNA in blood are associ-
ated with a greater need for mechanical ventila-
tion and extracorporeal respiratory support and 
with higher mortality.41,42 MERS-CoV RNA has 
been detected occasionally in stool (in 14.6% of 
patients with MERS) and urine (in 2.4%).39
Animal Models
Available animal models of MERS-CoV infection 
do not reliably recapitulate severe human infec-
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH LIB on February 9, 2017. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2017 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
T h e  n e w  e ngl a nd  j o u r na l  o f  m e dic i n e
n engl j med 376;6 nejm.org February 9, 2017588
tions. Laboratory rodents, including mice, are not 
susceptible to MERS-CoV.43 However, MERS-CoV 
susceptibility in mice has been described after 
transduction with an adenovirus vector express-
ing the human version of DPP-4.44 Similar to hu-
mans, a transgenic mouse expressing the human 
DPP-4 receptor has primarily pulmonary disease.45
In rhesus macaques and marmosets, inocula-
tion of the respiratory tract with MERS-CoV in-
duces clinical disease of varying severity. In rhesus 
macaques, a self-limited pneumonia develops after 
an incubation period of only 24 hours.37,46 Some 
studies in marmosets have shown extensive lung 
disease and virus replication, and detection of 
MERS-CoV RNA in multiple organs and in blood 
was associated with death.38,47 However, another 
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study could not reproduce the experimentally in-
duced illness in marmosets.48
Pathology
Insights into the pathobiology of MERS are lim-
ited. The principal autopsy finding in a patient 
with MERS who died approximately 12 days af-
ter the onset of illness was diffuse alveolar dam-
age. Double-staining immunoassays showed 
MERS-CoV antigen in pneumocytes and epithelial 
syncytial cells. No evidence of extrapulmonary 
MERS-CoV antigen was detected, even in the kid-
ney, despite the fact that renal insufficiency is a 
common clinical finding among critically ill pa-
tients.49
Immune Responses
Examination of infected mice expressing the hu-
man DPP-4 receptor showed that effective inter-
feron signaling and T cell–mediated immunity are 
required for viral clearance.44 Similar to other 
coronaviruses and many other pathogens, MERS-
CoV subverts host-cell pathways: nonstructural 
proteins such as nsp1 and nsp3, which are cleaved 
from the replicase polyprotein, directly target host-
cell functions and immune responses.50,51 In ad-
dition, MERS-CoV has a unique set of accessory 
genes, several of which may contribute to immune 
evasion and virulence (e.g., ORF4a, ORF4b, and 
ORF5), but it does not have immune-evasion pro-
teins such as SARS-CoV ORF6 protein, which re-
duces the signaling of signal transducer and acti-
vator of transcription 1.52,53
The milieu of cytokines in bronchoalveolar 
lavage fluid and serum have been studied in two 
patients with MERS.3 One patient, who did not 
survive, had persistent viral detection and blunt-
ed expression of antiviral sensing and response 
factors (retinoic acid–inducible gene 1, interferon 
regulatory factors 3 and 7, and interferon alfa) in 
bronchoalveolar lavage fluid. The other patient, 
who survived, had high levels of the antiviral fac-
tors in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid and achieved 
rapid viral clearance. These antiviral factors are 
part of the innate antiviral response and are in-
duced early in cells exposed to MERS-CoV.54
The kinetics and durability of specific anti-
body responses to MERS-CoV are not fully char-
acterized. Most patients produce serum IgG and 
secretory IgA within 2 weeks after the onset of 
illness.39,55,56 However, the presence of such anti-
bodies has not necessarily been followed by the 
elimination of MERS-CoV RNA from the lower 
respiratory tract, although data on titers of in-
fectious virus at this site are lacking.39 A decline 
in antibody levels over a period of several months 
has been observed in some convalescent patients.57
Clinic al Manifestations
Patients with symptomatic MERS present after 
an incubation period of 2 to 14 days. Mildly symp-
tomatic cases can be manifested by low-grade 
fever, runny nose, sore throat, and muscle aches. 
Severe disease is characterized by progression to 
Figure 3 (facing page). Transmission Patterns  
and Pathogenesis of the Middle East Respiratory  
Syndrome Coronavirus.
Panel A shows the structure, ecologic features, and 
transmission patterns of the Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS) coronavirus (MERS‑CoV). The viri‑
on surface is covered with the spike glycoprotein, a 
149 kDa glycoprotein that extends outward to create a 
crownlike appearance. The spike glycoprotein is criti‑
cal for binding the host‑cell receptor, dipeptidyl pepti‑
dase 4 (DPP‑4), to initiate infection. Dromedary cam‑
els are infected with the virus and are believed to be 
the most likely source of animal‑to‑human transmis‑
sion. Human‑to‑human transmission in household 
and health care settings has also occurred. Panel B 
shows the current understanding of key events in 
MERS pathogenesis, which is based on limited obser‑
vations in patients and data from animal and cell‑cul‑
ture model systems. After intratracheal inoculation of 
MERS‑CoV in nonhuman primates, the virus infects 
bronchial epithelial cells through DPP‑4 before spread‑
ing to lung parenchymal cells, including type I and 
type II alveolar pneumocytes and endothelial cells.  
Viral entry is facilitated by another cell‑surface protein, 
carcinoembryonic antigen–related cell‑adhesion mole‑
cule 5 (CEACAM5), which is also expressed in lung tis‑
sue. Inflammatory signaling molecules that are re‑
leased by infected cells, alveolar macrophages, and 
neutrophils recruited to infected tissue have been de‑
tected in infected patients (black text) and animal 
models (blue text). A host antiviral type I and type III 
interferon response occurs, with systemic release of 
proinflammatory cytokines and chemokines.3,4 The vi‑
rus may spread into the circulation, possibly from lung 
parenchyma or through infected endothelial cells. In 
humans, a high viral copy number has been detected 
in the lower respiratory tract, including tracheal aspi‑
rates and bronchoalveolar lavage specimens, as well 
as in peripheral blood. In advanced disease, diffuse al‑
veolar damage is seen, with extensive hemorrhagic 
edema and hyaline membrane deposition. CXCL10 de‑
notes C‑X‑C motif chemokine 10, IL interleukin, IL‑1RA 
IL‑1 receptor antagonist, IFN interferon, and MCP 
monocyte chemotactic protein.
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the acute respiratory distress syndrome, with a 
median of 2 days between hospitalization and 
admission to the intensive care unit.58 In severely 
ill patients, chest radiographs and computed tomo-
graphic scans often show multilobar airspace 
disease, ground-glass opacities, and occasional 
pleural effusions. Thoracic imaging is usually 
normal in patients with mild illness.
Extrapulmonary manifestations are common 
among severely ill patients. Up to one third of 
critically ill patients have gastrointestinal symp-
toms, such as nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. Acute 
kidney injury has been reported in up to half of 
critically ill patients.58 Stillbirth has been reported 
in a pregnant woman with probable MERS.59 
Neurologic manifestations suggestive of enceph-
alitis have been reported in three cases.60 Labo-
ratory findings typically include leukopenia and 
lymphopenia and occasionally include thrombo-
cytopenia and anemia. Mild-to-moderate elevation 
of aminotransferase levels is common, especially 
among critically ill patients. (For further details, 
see Fig. S1 and Tables S4, S5, and S6 in the Sup-
plementary Appendix.)
Diagnosis
Diagnostic Approach to a Suspected Case
The clinical features of MERS often do not differ 
from those of other acute febrile respiratory ill-
nesses or pneumonia. Therefore, a diagnostic 
workup for MERS in a patient with an acute respi-
ratory illness, with or without fever, should be 
guided by the presence of both clinical suspicion 
and an epidemiologic link61 (Fig. S1 and Table S7 
in the Supplementary Appendix). Once MERS is 
suspected, immediate precautions for infection 
control should be taken, and specimens from the 
upper and lower respiratory tracts should be col-
lected for real-time RT-PCR analysis. Specimens 
from the lower respiratory tract that are obtained 
early during the course of the illness (within 
7 days after symptom onset) appear to have the 
best diagnostic sensitivity.62 Repeat testing of 
samples from the lower respiratory tract over a 
period of several days increases the diagnostic 
yield. In hospitalized patients, testing serum spec-
imens with the use of real-time RT-PCR analysis 
is also recommended. For patients presenting with 
symptoms that have lasted for 14 days or longer, 
serologic testing for MERS-CoV–specific antibod-
ies may inform the diagnosis.
In some severely ill patients with laboratory-
confirmed MERS, coinfection with other respi-
ratory viral or bacterial pathogens has been de-
tected on presentation.58,63 An appropriate diagnostic 
workup should be performed and empirical an-
tibiotic or antiviral treatment (or both) should be 
administered in accordance with the clinical 
syndrome (e.g., community-acquired or hospital-
acquired pneumonia) while the test results for 
MERS-CoV are pending. Detection of a conven-
tional respiratory viral or bacterial pathogen should 
not deter clinicians from testing for MERS-CoV in 
patients for whom a high index of suspicion is 
present.
Molecular Testing
Laboratory confirmation of MERS by means of 
real-time RT-PCR assay requires positivity at two 
different MERS-CoV genomic target sites or detec-
tion at a single target site followed by sequence 
confirmation at a second site (Fig. S1 in the Sup-
plementary Appendix).64,65 Screening and con-
firmatory molecular assays for MERS-CoV are 
summarized in Table S8 in the Supplementary 
Appendix. Currently, an assay targeting the region 
upstream of the envelope gene (upE) is recom-
mended for screening, and an assay targeting 
ORF1a is used for confirmation.65
Antibody Detection
MERS can be confirmed by seroconversion in two 
samples obtained 14 days apart.64 A two-stage ap-
proach for MERS-CoV serologic testing has been 
recommended. First, screening is performed by 
means of enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay or 
immunofluorescence assay with the use of the 
recombinant MERS-CoV spike glycoprotein S1 sub-
unit. Then, confirmatory testing is performed by 
means of immunofluorescence assay of MERS-
CoV–infected cells or virus neutralization assay.7,9
Virus Culture
MERS-CoV has been successfully isolated in cell 
culture, most commonly from specimens from the 
lower respiratory tract.66 However, viral culture re-
quires high-level biocontainment facilities.
Treatment
Current Approach
No specific antiviral therapies have been shown 
to be effective for the treatment of MERS. Pre-
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vention of complications and organ support define 
the current standards of care.
Investigational Studies in Humans
Data from randomized clinical trials investigat-
ing whether the use of therapeutics licensed for 
other indications are effective in patients with 
MERS are lacking. Retrospective observational 
reports of treatment with ribavirin and interfer-
ons do not indicate consistent clinical benefits 
(Table S9 in the Supplementary Appendix).42,67 A 
meta-analysis of observational studies of passive 
immunotherapy for SARS and severe influenza 
suggests a decrease in mortality associated with 
timely use of blood products from convalescent 
patients, particularly those with neutralizing anti-
bodies.68 Thus, fresh-frozen plasma (or hyperim-
mune intravenous immune globulin) produced 
from patients who have recovered from MERS 
could be an investigational therapy. However, col-
lection of sufficient high-titer plasma for experi-
mental use may prove to be an obstacle to further 
evaluation and wider therapeutic application.57 
Other neutralizing-antibody preparations have 
been developed that are effective in animal models 
(Table S9 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Immunomodulatory Agents
Despite the common use of glucocorticoids for 
severe MERS illness,58 a retrospective analysis in-
volving patients with SARS suggests that gluco-
corticoid therapy may be associated with increased 
mortality.69 Because the safety and effectiveness 
of glucocorticoids in patients with MERS are un-
certain, use of glucocorticoids should be avoided 
unless they are indicated for other clinical reasons 
or conditions or they are being studied in the con-
text of a clinical trial.
Preclinical Studies with Licensed  
and Experimental Drugs
Ribavirin has been shown to have inhibitory ef-
fects in vitro but at concentrations greatly exceed-
ing those reached with usual clinical doses.70 
Nonetheless, among rhesus macaques that had 
been exposed to MERS-CoV 8 hours previously, 
treatment with high doses of ribavirin and inter-
feron alfa-2b was associated with modest antivi-
ral effects and with fewer pulmonary changes 
than was no treatment.4 Marmosets treated with 
lopinavir–ritonavir or interferon beta-1b had sub-
stantially lower morbidity and mortality than mar-
mosets treated with mycophenolate mofetil and 
than untreated controls.47 Various experimental 
polyclonal and monoclonal antibodies, peptide 
constructs, and polymerase inhibitors have been 
tested in animal models; several are in early clini-
cal development, and one placebo-controlled trial 
of interferon beta-1b and lopinavir–ritonavir 
has recently begun (ClinicalTrials.gov number, 
NCT02845843). Multiple other licensed drugs 
have shown antiviral effects in vitro or have 
been proposed as host-directed therapeutics.71 At 
present, none of these drugs can be recommend-
ed for the treatment of MERS outside the context 
of a clinical trial. (For further details, see Table S9 
in the Supplementary Appendix.)
Prevention
MERS-CoV Transmission
Public health authorities, including the WHO, 
advocate the use of various nonpharmaceutical 
interventions for the prevention of MERS-CoV 
transmission (Table S10 in the Supplementary 
Appendix). Strategies aimed at reducing the risk 
of animal-to-human transmission, rapid identi-
fication of cases, tracing of all contacts in clusters 
associated with health care settings,61 and appro-
priate infection control are core components of 
the control and prevention of MERS-CoV infection.
Vaccines and Chemoprophylaxis
Candidate MERS vaccines are under development 
for use in humans and potentially for use in drom-
edaries (Table S11 in the Supplementary Appen-
dix). The primary target for these candidate vac-
cines is the spike glycoprotein S1 subunit. The 
range of vaccine approaches includes live attenu-
ated, spike protein subunit, DNA, nanoparticles, 
and recombinant vector constructs. Major chal-
lenges in the development of the vaccines include 
identifying an appropriate animal model and 
establishing humoral and cellular correlates of 
protection in humans, as well as assessing the 
potential for an up-regulated, harmful immune 
response upon subsequent exposure to the wild-
type virus.72 Data on chemoprophylaxis from con-
trolled studies involving humans are lacking.
Future Direc tions
Our knowledge about MERS is increasing, but 
more work is required to characterize certain eco-
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logic and epidemiologic features of MERS-CoV, 
including the routes of animal-to-human and hu-
man-to-human transmission and the sources of 
infection in sporadic cases. In addition to better 
characterizing the dynamics of MERS-CoV viral 
replication and their relationship to clinical man-
ifestations, we need to assess innate and adap-
tive immune responses and possible host genetic 
susceptibility factors. Further autopsy studies are 
essential to inform our understanding of the 
disease pathology and the extent of extrapulmo-
nary infection. There is a pressing need for evalu-
ation of potential therapies and vaccines through 
collaborative and coordinated clinical trials con-
ducted across affected regions. Lowering the risk 
to humans requires more effective control of an-
imal-to-human transmission and, ideally, an ef-
fective dromedary vaccine. The lack of adequate 
studies of clinical characterization and disease 
pathogenesis, which is common among emerging 
infectious diseases, can be addressed in part by 
developing preapproved research protocols for 
rapid implementation in response to a new or 
emerging infection.73,74 The continued threat of 
MERS — including severe illness, periodic noso-
comial outbreaks, and international spread — 
calls for enhanced international collaboration to 
address these research priorities.
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